FITAFinance Indicators Tracking Apparatus
Macro snapshot, November 2026Christopher K. Harrison
Switzerland leads at 4.5. The United States trails at 2.5, held back by its budget deficit.
Policy is neutral in five economies and accommodative in the euro area. Brent at $123.1 a barrel is above the $100 line where oil becomes a shock for importers.
Eight economies scored on growth, inflation, fiscal and external balance by fixed rules. Data pulled 2 November 2026. Arrows compare with the pull of 1 November 2026.
The machine
Global conditions
The tide every economy below draws from.
- Fed balance sheet
- $6.75 tnLittle changedFalling drains dollar liquidity; rising adds it.
- Broad dollar
- 121.3Little changedA strong dollar tightens conditions abroad.
- VIX
- 19.4Normal1 Nov: 17.2Under 15 calm, 15 to 25 normal, 25 to 30 elevated, over 30 stress.
- US high-yield spread
- 3.26%NormalUnder 3% tight, 3 to 5% normal, over 6% stress.
- US 10y minus 2y
- +0.38 ppPositiveNegative means inverted.
- Brent crude
- $123.1Above $100Over about $100 a barrel is a shock for importers.
- Bitcoin
- $78,111A gauge of speculative risk appetite. Shown, not scored.
Tanks, left to right: Growth, Inflation, Fiscal, External. Level and colour are the score, 1 to 5.12345
Valve: the policy stance. Real rate is the policy rate minus inflation; a shut valve is tight money.Openreal rate below −1%Halfin betweenShutabove 1%No single rateIMF country group
Economy by economy
In the order of the machine. Hover a score for the numbers behind it.
1
Switzerland
Neutral policy, real rate −0.99%
4.5of 5
- Growth this year
- 1.9%
- Policy rate
- 0.00%
- 10-year yield
- 0.59%
- Unemployment
- 3.0%
- Business confidence
- 100.6
- FX reserves
- $1,076 bn
2
Japan
Neutral policy, real rate −0.98%
4.3of 5
- Growth this year
- 0.7%
- Policy rate
- 1.25%
- 10-year yield
- 3.05%
- Unemployment
- 2.5%
- Business confidence
- 101.7
- FX reserves
- $1,371 bn
3
Euro area
Accommodative policy, real rate −1.25%
3.5of 5
- Growth this year
- 1.1%
- Policy rate
- 2.50%
- 10-year yield
- 3.22%
- Unemployment
- 6.3%
- Business confidence
- 100.2
4
Middle East & Central Asia
IMF aggregate, no single policy rate
3.3of 5
- Growth this year
- −0.3%
5
Emerging & developing
IMF aggregate, no single policy rate
3.3of 5
- Growth this year
- 3.7%
6
China
Neutral policy, real rate 0.50%
3.0of 5 from 2.8
- Growth this year
- 4.5%
- Policy rate
- 1.40%
- 10-year yield
- 1.65%
- Unemployment
- 5.1%
- Business confidence
- 98.4
- FX reserves
- $3,749 bn
7
United Kingdom
Neutral policy, real rate 0.25%
2.8of 5
- Growth this year
- 1.3%
- Policy rate
- 3.75%
- 10-year yield
- 5.24%
- Unemployment
- 5.3%
- Business confidence
- 101.5
- FX reserves
- $214 bn
8
United States
Neutral policy, real rate 0.28%
2.5of 5
- Growth this year
- 2.3%
- Policy rate
- 4.00%
- 10-year yield
- 4.98%
- Unemployment
- 4.2%
- Business confidence
- 100.3
- FX reserves
- $1,385 bn
After the first print
The largest revisions to official figures still in the window, from the St. Louis Fed's archive of every published version. Markets trade the first print; the economy is the revised one.
- US real GDP growth, annualised, Q4 2025First print 1.4%Now 0.2%−1.2 pp
- US real GDP growth, annualised, Q2 2025First print 3.0%Now 4.0%+1.0 pp
- US real GDP growth, annualised, Q2 2026First print 1.5%Now 2.2%+0.7 pp
- US real GDP growth, annualised, Q1 2026First print 2.0%Now 2.5%+0.5 pp
- US unemployment rate, Nov 2025First print 4.6%Now 4.5%−0.1 pp
- US unemployment rate, Jul 2025First print 4.2%Now 4.3%+0.1 pp
Track record
Every call stays on the record, scored 1 right, 0 unclear, −1 wrong.
No calls logged yet. Each call gets a date, a level that would prove it wrong and a horizon, and is scored once the horizon passes.
What the record shows
The same rules, tested against what actually followed (1870 to 2020, actual data; IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024; US monthly data since 1871, one test each December). 3 hold clearly, 4 lean, 2 are mixed, 16 are not supported. Cases are the most recent, picked by rule, not by hand. The label weighs how many separate years back a result, not only the hit rate: 81% across 14 years can be weaker evidence than 63% across 112. Mixed: passes one test and fails the other, so neither claim it nor dismiss it.
3 hold4 lean2 mixed16 not supported
6 of 7 rules with a live reading are on now in at least one economy, by today's figures.
Holds
If an economy grows at least 0.5 points faster than its 10-year average, then next year it still grows at or above that average
1870 to 2020, actual data
No live reading: needs this year's growth against its own 10-year average, which FITA doesn't pull.
63% against 50% by chance
Gold standard
1870 to 191356 vs 54 no evidenceBetween the wars
1920 to 193862 vs 46 no evidenceBretton Woods
1950 to 197269 vs 54 leansFloating rates
1973 to 201968 vs 46 holdsBut not faster: growth was slower than the strong year itself in 73% of these cases (608 of 828). A strong year is usually followed by another above-trend year, just a slower one.
Where the evidence comes from. It passes on its own in 2 of 4 periods (Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972, Floating rates 1973 to 2019). The biggest gap is Floating rates 1973 to 2019, 22 points. By period: Gold standard 1870 to 1913: 56% vs 54% over 37 years (no evidence); Between the wars 1920 to 1938: 62% vs 46% over 13 years (no evidence); Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972: 69% vs 54% over 18 years (leans); Floating rates 1973 to 2019: 68% vs 46% over 44 years (holds).
Held in 63% of cases (523 of 828, across 112 separate years), against 50% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Belgium, 2018: grew 1.7% against a 10-year trend of 1.1%. 2019: grew 1.7%, above trend (about the same pace as 2018).
- Canada, 2017: grew 3.1% against a 10-year trend of 1.9%. 2018: grew 2.4%, above trend (slower than 2017).
- Germany, 2016: grew 2.2% against a 10-year trend of 1.6%. 2017: grew 2.7%, above trend (faster than 2016).
- Denmark, 2015: grew 2.2% against a 10-year trend of 0.8%. 2016: grew 3.3%, above trend (faster than 2015).
- Spain, 2014: grew 1.5% against a 10-year trend of 0.7%. 2015: grew 4.1%, above trend (faster than 2014).
Latest miss. Switzerland, 2018: grew 2.9% against a 10-year trend of 1.6%. 2019: grew 1.2%, below trend (slower than 2018).
Holds
If an economy grows more than 0.5 points slower than its 10-year average, then next year it still grows below that average
1870 to 2020, actual data
No live reading: needs this year's growth against its own 10-year average, which FITA doesn't pull.
64% against 50% by chance
Gold standard
1870 to 191348 vs 46 no evidenceBetween the wars
1920 to 193868 vs 54 leansBretton Woods
1950 to 197260 vs 46 leansFloating rates
1973 to 201976 vs 54 holdsIt usually improves, though: growth was at least as fast as the weak year in 68% of these cases (583 of 854), but stayed under trend.
Where the evidence comes from. It passes on its own in 3 of 4 periods (Between the wars 1920 to 1938, Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972, Floating rates 1973 to 2019). The biggest gap is Floating rates 1973 to 2019, 22 points. By period: Gold standard 1870 to 1913: 48% vs 46% over 37 years (no evidence); Between the wars 1920 to 1938: 68% vs 54% over 13 years (leans); Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972: 60% vs 46% over 18 years (leans); Floating rates 1973 to 2019: 76% vs 54% over 46 years (holds).
Held in 64% of cases (546 of 854, across 114 separate years), against 50% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Canada, 2015: grew 0.7% against a 10-year trend of 2.5%. 2016: grew 0.9%, below trend (faster than 2015).
- Finland, 2014: shrank 0.4% against a 10-year trend of 1.2%. 2015: grew 0.5%, below trend (faster than 2014).
- Australia, 2013: grew 2.5% against a 10-year trend of 3.1%. 2014: grew 2.5%, below trend (about the same pace as 2013).
- Belgium, 2012: grew 0.8% against a 10-year trend of 1.7%. 2013: grew 0.5%, below trend (slower than 2012).
- Spain, 2011: shrank 0.8% against a 10-year trend of 2.2%. 2012: shrank 3.1%, below trend (slower than 2011).
Latest miss. Australia, 2017: grew 2.2% against a 10-year trend of 2.8%. 2018: grew 3.0%, above trend (faster than 2017).
Holds
If the IMF forecasts growth at least 0.5 points above trend, then growth does come in at or above trend
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024
On now in Middle East & Central Asia, China and United States
81% against 43% by chance
One period only
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024Against a shortcut: instead of the IMF's forecast, simply assume next year will look like this year (score this year's growth the same way). That shortcut was right 55% of the time (51 cases); the forecast was right 81%, so the forecast adds real information.
Where the evidence comes from. Tested on 2000 to 2024 only, one stretch of history, so there is no earlier period to check it against.
Held in 81% of cases (26 of 32, across 14 separate years), against 43% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Japan, IMF outlook of autumn 2022: forecast 1.6% for 2023 against a trend of 0.4%. It came in at 1.7%, above trend.
- Switzerland, IMF outlook of autumn 2021: forecast 3.0% for 2022 against a trend of 1.8%. It came in at 2.7%, above trend.
- China, IMF outlook of autumn 2020: forecast 8.2% for 2021 against a trend of 5.5%. It came in at 8.1%, above trend.
- United States, IMF outlook of autumn 2018: forecast 2.5% for 2019 against a trend of 1.4%. It came in at 2.2%, above trend.
- Emerging and developing economies, IMF outlook of autumn 2006: forecast 7.2% for 2007 against a trend of 6.5%. It came in at 8.0%, above trend.
Latest miss. China, IMF outlook of autumn 2021: forecast 5.6% for 2022 against a trend of 4.9%. It came in at 3.0%, below trend.
LeansCaveat
If inflation runs more than 1 point below 2%, then short-term interest rates do not rise the next year
1870 to 2020, actual data
On now in Switzerland (CPI 0.99%) and China (0.90%)
Live reading uses the latest 12-month CPI.
62% against 57% by chance
Gold standard
1870 to 191360 vs 56 no evidenceBetween the wars
1920 to 193865 vs 65 no evidenceBretton Woods
1950 to 197259 vs 54 no evidenceFloating rates
1973 to 201966 vs 57 no evidenceWhere the evidence comes from. Caveat: no period passes on its own; the result only appears when all periods are counted together. The biggest gap is Floating rates 1973 to 2019, 10 points. By period: Gold standard 1870 to 1913: 60% vs 56% over 42 years (no evidence); Between the wars 1920 to 1938: 65% vs 65% over 18 years (no evidence); Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972: 59% vs 54% over 12 years (no evidence); Floating rates 1973 to 2019: 66% vs 57% over 29 years (no evidence).
Held in 62% of cases (470 of 757, across 101 separate years), against 57% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Switzerland, 2018: inflation 0.9%. In 2019 the short-term rate barely fell (0.05 points), -0.95% to -1.00%.
- Japan, 2017: inflation 0.5%. In 2018 the short-term rate barely fell (0.01 points), -0.05% to -0.06%.
- Germany, 2016: inflation 0.4%. In 2017 the short-term rate barely fell (0.04 points), -0.32% to -0.35%.
- Belgium, 2015: inflation 0.6%. In 2016 the short-term rate fell 0.36 points, -0.22% to -0.58%.
- Denmark, 2014: inflation 0.4%. In 2015 the short-term rate fell 0.19 points, 0.06% to -0.13%.
Latest miss. Japan, 2018: inflation 1.0%. In 2019 the short-term rate barely rose (0.01 points), -0.06% to -0.05%.
LeansCaveat
If inflation runs more than 1 point above 2%, then long-term bond yields rise the next year
1870 to 2020, actual data
On now in Euro area (CPI 3.75%), Middle East & Central Asia (13.00%), Emerging & developing (5.70%), United Kingdom (3.50%) and United States (3.72%)
Live reading uses the latest 12-month CPI.
50% against 44% by chance
Gold standard
1870 to 191355 vs 44 leansBetween the wars
1920 to 193838 vs 36 no evidenceBretton Woods
1950 to 197257 vs 61 no evidenceFloating rates
1973 to 201945 vs 39 no evidenceWhere the evidence comes from. Caveat: it passes on its own in one period only (Gold standard 1870 to 1913). The biggest gap is Gold standard 1870 to 1913, 11 points. By period: Gold standard 1870 to 1913: 55% vs 44% over 38 years (leans); Between the wars 1920 to 1938: 38% vs 36% over 14 years (no evidence); Bretton Woods 1950 to 1972: 57% vs 61% over 23 years (no evidence); Floating rates 1973 to 2019: 45% vs 39% over 37 years (no evidence).
When it breaks. It held 56% of the time when inflation was still rising, against 50% for any case in that position (516 cases, 103 years: leans); when inflation had already turned down, 39% against 39% (292 cases: no evidence). This split was found by exploring the same data, so it is a lead, not proof. Checked on IMF test dates since 2000, it did not repeat: 33% against 42% (no evidence).
Held in 50% of cases (407 of 814, across 112 separate years), against 44% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Norway, 2016: inflation 3.5%. In 2017 the long-term yield rose 0.23 points, 0.84% to 1.07%.
- Spain, 2011: inflation 3.2%. In 2012 the long-term yield rose 0.41 points, 5.44% to 5.84%.
- Finland, 2008: inflation 3.9%. In 2009 the long-term yield rose 0.69 points, 4.45% to 5.14%.
- Ireland, 2007: inflation 4.9%. In 2008 the long-term yield rose 0.22 points, 4.31% to 4.53%.
- Australia, 2006: inflation 3.6%. In 2007 the long-term yield rose 0.41 points, 5.59% to 5.99%.
Latest miss. Finland, 2012: inflation 3.2%. In 2013 the long-term yield fell 2.34 points, 6.07% to 3.73%.
Leans
If the IMF forecasts growth more than 0.5 points below trend, then growth does come in below trend
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024
Not on now in any of the 8 economies
81% against 57% by chance
One period only
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024Against a shortcut: instead of the IMF's forecast, simply assume next year will look like this year (score this year's growth the same way). That shortcut was right 62% of the time (65 cases); the forecast was right 81%, so the forecast adds real information.
Where the evidence comes from. Tested on 2000 to 2024 only, one stretch of history, so there is no earlier period to check it against.
Held in 81% of cases (35 of 43, across 14 separate years), against 57% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Euro area, IMF outlook of autumn 2022: forecast 0.5% for 2023 against a trend of 1.5%. It came in at 0.4%, below trend.
- United Kingdom, IMF outlook of autumn 2016: forecast 1.1% for 2017 against a trend of 1.9%. It came in at 1.7%, below trend.
- Switzerland, IMF outlook of autumn 2015: forecast 1.3% for 2016 against a trend of 1.9%. It came in at 1.4%, below trend.
- Emerging and developing economies, IMF outlook of autumn 2012: forecast 5.6% for 2013 against a trend of 6.2%. It came in at 4.7%, below trend.
- United States, IMF outlook of autumn 2011: forecast 1.8% for 2012 against a trend of 3.4%. It came in at 2.8%, below trend.
Latest miss. Emerging and developing economies, IMF outlook of autumn 2022: forecast 3.7% for 2023 against a trend of 4.3%. It came in at 4.4%, above trend.
Leans
If the government runs a large deficit (today's figures; indicative), then its 10-year yield rises more than the others' over the next 12 months
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024
On now in China and United States
69% against 54% by chance
One period only
IMF forecasts 2000 to 2024Uses today's revised fiscal data for the year before each test date.
Where the evidence comes from. Tested on 2000 to 2024 only, one stretch of history, so there is no earlier period to check it against.
When it breaks. It held 80% of the time when the yield started below the group average, against 56% for any case in that position (15 cases, 14 years: leans); when the yield was already above the group average, 57% against 54% (14 cases: too few to judge). The split was first found on 150 years of data (75% against 60% there, holds) and then tested here, on years that overlap from 2000 to 2019, so the two are not fully independent.
Today. 10-year yields against the average of the 6 economies with one (3.12%): China (1.65%) is below the average, where it has leaned the right way; United States (4.98%) is above the average, where there are too few past cases to judge.
Held in 69% of cases (20 of 29, across 17 separate years), against 54% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- Japan, autumn 2022: second-weakest fiscal score (2 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield rose 0.70 points while the group average rose 0.49 points.
- United Kingdom, autumn 2021: weakest fiscal score (1 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield rose 3.03 points while the group average rose 1.91 points.
- United States, autumn 2020: second-weakest fiscal score (2 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield rose 0.79 points while the group average rose 0.49 points.
- Japan, autumn 2015: second-weakest fiscal score (2 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield fell 0.35 points while the group average fell 0.39 points.
- Japan, autumn 2014: weakest fiscal score (1 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield fell 0.17 points while the group average fell 0.42 points.
Latest miss. United States, autumn 2024: weakest fiscal score (1 of 5). Over the next 12 months its 10-year yield barely fell (0.04 points) while the group average rose 0.21 points.
MixedCaveat
If US inflation runs more than 1 point above 2%, then the 10-year Treasury yield is higher a year later
US monthly data since 1871, one test each December
On now in United States (CPI 3.72%)
Live reading uses the latest 12-month CPI.
60% against 47% by chance
before 195357 vs 37 too few to judge1953 on61 vs 56 no evidenceRobustness check: tested on every month instead of each December, it scores 51% against 48% (No evidence), so the result does not hold up.
Where the evidence comes from. Caveat: no period passes on its own; the result only appears when all periods are counted together. The biggest gap is before 1953 (yields estimated between yearly readings), 20 points. By period: before 1953 (yields estimated between yearly readings): 57% vs 37% over 14 years (too few to judge); 1953 on (measured monthly): 61% vs 56% over 33 years (no evidence).
When it breaks. It held 64% of the time when inflation was still rising, against 52% for any case in that position (33 cases, 33 years: leans); when inflation had already turned down, 50% against 43% (14 cases: too few to judge). This split was found by exploring the same data, so it is a lead, not proof. Checked on IMF test dates since 2000, it did not repeat: 33% against 42% (no evidence).
Held in 60% of cases (28 of 47, across 47 separate years), against 47% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- United States, December 2023: inflation 3.4%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield rose 0.37 points, 4.02% to 4.39%.
- United States, December 2022: inflation 6.5%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield rose 0.40 points, 3.62% to 4.02%.
- United States, December 2021: inflation 7.0%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield rose 2.15 points, 1.47% to 3.62%.
- United States, December 2005: inflation 3.4%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield barely rose (0.09 points), 4.47% to 4.56%.
- United States, December 2004: inflation 3.3%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield rose 0.24 points, 4.23% to 4.47%.
Latest miss. United States, December 2007: inflation 4.1%. Over the next 12 months the 10-year yield fell 1.68 points, 4.10% to 2.42%.
MixedCaveat
If US inflation runs more than 1 point above 2%, then US stocks do worse than in a typical year, after inflation
US monthly data since 1871, one test each December
On now in United States (CPI 3.72%)
Live reading uses the latest 12-month CPI.
51% against 50% by chance
before 195357 vs 55 too few to judge1953 on48 vs 46 no evidenceRobustness check: tested on every month instead of each December, it scores 57% against 50% (Weak), so the every-month version passes where the December one does not.
Where the evidence comes from. No period passes on its own either. The biggest gap is 1953 on (measured monthly), 3 points. By period: before 1953 (yields estimated between yearly readings): 57% vs 55% over 14 years (too few to judge); 1953 on (measured monthly): 48% vs 46% over 33 years (no evidence).
Held in 51% of cases (24 of 47, across 47 separate years), against 50% for any case.
5 recent cases and the latest miss
- United States, December 2021: inflation 7.0%. Stocks returned -20.1% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
- United States, December 2007: inflation 4.1%. Stocks returned -39.3% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
- United States, December 2004: inflation 3.3%. Stocks returned +3.5% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
- United States, December 2000: inflation 3.4%. Stocks returned -14.2% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
- United States, December 1989: inflation 4.6%. Stocks returned -8.0% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
Latest miss. United States, December 2023: inflation 3.4%. Stocks returned +26.4% after inflation over the next 12 months (typical year +11.1%).
holdsleansno evidencetoo few to judge
Tested and not supported (16)
Less than 5 points better than chance, or a gap small enough to be luck.
- If inflation runs more than 1 point above 2%, then short-term interest rates rise the next year45% vs 43%
- If the current account deficit is over 2% of GDP, then the currency falls against the dollar54% vs 51%
- If the current account surplus is 2% of GDP or more, then the currency rises against the dollar50% vs 47%
- If the short-term rate is more than 1 point above inflation, then growth slows the next year53% vs 52%
- If the short-term rate is more than 1 point below inflation, then growth does not slow the next year45% vs 48%
- If the economies are ranked by composite score, then the top third's stock markets beat the bottom third's55% vs 50%
- If the government runs a large deficit (or a deficit with debt over 100% of GDP), then its long-term yield rises more than other countries'57% vs 53%
- If inflation runs more than 1 point above target, then the central bank raises rates within 12 months30% vs 23%
- If inflation runs more than 1 point below target, then the central bank does not raise rates within 12 months86% vs 77%
- If inflation runs more than 1 point above target, then the 10-year yield rises within 12 months25% vs 40%
- If the current account deficit is over 2% of GDP, then the currency falls against the dollar50% vs 43%
- If the current account surplus is 2% of GDP or more, then the currency rises against the dollar59% vs 56%
- If the real policy rate is above +1%, then growth slows the next year63% vs 57%
- If the real policy rate is below -1%, then growth does not slow the next year36% vs 43%
- If the economies are ranked by composite score, then the top three's stock markets beat the bottom three's44% vs 50%
- If US inflation runs more than 1 point below 2%, then the 10-year Treasury yield is not higher a year later58% vs 53%
How the machine reads
Fixed rules, the same every month. The judgement is in the rules, not in the reading.
Each economy gets four scores from 1 to 5. Growth compares the IMF's next-year forecast with trend growth, taken as the IMF's own forecast five years out. Inflation measures the distance of the latest CPI from the central bank's target. Fiscal scores the budget balance, minus one point when gross debt is above 100% of GDP. External scores the current account. The composite is their plain average, and the machine ranks economies by it.
The valve is the policy stance: the policy rate minus inflation. Above 1% it is restrictive and the valve is shut; below −1% it is accommodative and open; in between, half open. Arrows mark a score that moved since the previous pull.
Personal research from public data. Not investment advice.
Christopher K. Harrison